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I. INTRODUCTION 
Communism  and  the  transition  to  market  based  systems  have  been  called  the  two  great 
economic experiments of the twentieth century (Stiglitz and Pleskovic, 2000). When comparing 
the Eastern Europe and Former Soviet Union (EEFSU) nations transition of the early 1990s with 
that of East Asian experience in the late 1970s to early 1980s, the consensus appears to be that 
China undertook a highly successful transition, whilst EEFSU was a mixed bag. 
The  main  debate  through  the  transitions  was  whether  to  take  a  fast  (big  bang)  or  slow 
(gradualist) approach to reform. Given that both approaches were taken in EEFSU with similar 
net  results,  great  emphasis  needs  to  be  put  on  other  elements  such  the  role  of  institutions, 
privatization, and unique conditions within the nation.  
With the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, it was clear that successor states would move to 
a market based systems. A series of reforms based around somewhat called the “Washington 
Concensus”,  which  primarily  focused  on  liberalization,  privatization,  and  stabilization  were 
generally  accepted.  Pomfret  (2002)  argued  that  with  western  support  in  the  form  of 
“econolobbyists”, it is not hard to see why these reforms were accepted.  
Whether there was debate over the reforms which centered around social support as one of 
standout successes of socialist nations was their “cradle to the grave” support. Primarily, the 
debate was to what pace should and in what sequence the transformation should take place. In 
line with this argument, Pomfret (2002) later proved that sequencing did not play a big role as 
some  reforms  needed  to  occur  before  others.  However,  it  is  clear  that  from  the  Russian 
experience sequencing is very important, which is particularly the case with privatization.  
II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 The Political Economy Approach 
The  Big  Bang  or  shock  therapy  approach  was  one  taken  in  Poland,  Slovenia,  Czech 
Republic,  Estonia,  and  Russia.  It  involved  undertaking  all  the  reforms  to  a  market  based 
economy in the shortest amount of time possible. It is believed that there was a limited window 
of opportunity to carry out the reforms and to achieve a new market based, the old soviet 
institutions would need to be torn down before they had  a chance to reestablish (Pomfret, 
2002).  
Countries which used shock therapy have been categorized as incurring a deeper recession 
than nations which took a gradualist approach, however, the formers have experienced in faster 
growth than the latter. Poland is good example of this where there was an economic downturn 
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in real GDP from 10% in 1989 to 7% in 1991 but after that, they enjoyed growth of between 
3% and 7% (Pomfret, 2002). 
Several arguments have been proposed to endorse a big-bang approach to various types of 
reforms. First, in the context of privatization, a big-bang approach provides a critical scale of 
privatized sector in the economy so that the privatized firms will be efficient (Roland and 
Verdier, 1994). Second, a big-bang may increase the credibility of reform (Lipton and Sachs, 
1990). Third, the gradualist alternative gives time to reform opponents to organize themselves 
and  thus  invites  a  formidable  resistance  (Krueger,  1993).  Fourth,  in  the  context  of  price 
reforms, gradual reform seems to be undesirable based on the fact that it potentially generate 
an intertemporal speculation (van Wijnbergen, 1992). Fifth, sequential plans did not work if 
any reform program needs approval consensus such that it induces time-inconsistency problem. 
Finally, a big-bang approach brings the benefit more quickly (World Bank, 1991).         
Despite the economic success of shock therapy, it was never of political success in which 
the shock therapy governments thrown out after one term (Marangos, 2003). However, Stiglitz 
and  Pleskovic  (2000)  argued  that  reformers  relied  too  much  on  simplistic  “textbook 
economics”. Advocates of shock therapy insisted that post transition in shock therapy was 
never undertaken as they prescribed (Marangos, 2003). It would now appear that shock therapy 
was not a success with who undertook this process getting the worst of the shock without solid 
institutions.  
In the proponent view, Stiglitz et al (2007) pointed out that the irony of it all is that the 
modern critique of utopian social engineering was based on the Bolshevik approach to the 
transition from capitalism to communism, and the shock therapy approach tried to use many of 
the same principles for the reverse transition. With the right textbooks in their briefcases, “the 
market Bolsheviks” would be able to fly into post socialist countries and use a peaceful version 
of Lenin’s methods to make the opposite transition. 
Gradualist  on  the  other  hand  preferred  a  slower  approach  to  economic  reform,  fearing 
political ramifications of economic reform could lead to the new governments being thrown 
out  and  a  return  of  central  planning  (Pomfret,  2002).  Concern  was  also  raised  that  good 
institutions and legal systems take time. Beside, rushing into a new structure without carefully 
considering the ramifications could be potentially disastrous. It is expected that appropriate 
sequencing of reforms would provide demonstrated successes to build upon, and thus creating 
constituencies for further reforms (Wei, 1997). Countries that took the gradualist approach 
included Romania, Ukraine, Hungary, and China. 
There are several proponent arguments in favor of a gradualist approach to reform. First, a 
gradualist approach may avoid excessive cost, especially for the government budget (Nielsen, 
1993). Second, it avoids an excessive reduction in standard of living at the start of a reform 
(Wang, 1992). Third, it allows trial and error and mid-course adjustment (World Bank, 1991). 
Finally, it helps a government to gain incremental credibility (Fang, 1992). 
In the context of the political economy of the choice of reform strategies, it is possible that 
gradualism is politically preferred to the big-bang. Dewatripont and Roland (1992) argue that 
under the political constraints that a program needs a unanimous support, a gradualist approach 
imposes less pressure on government budget than a big-bang based on an assumption that there 3 
 
is  asymmetric  information  between  the  government  and  workers  with  respect  to  workers’ 
ability.  In  contrast,  by  assuming  individual  uncertainty  on  transition  costs  in  which  the 
government  and workers  have the same  ex-ante information,  Wei  (1997) concludes that  a 
gradualist approach may not always be better than a big bang. This idea comes from the fact 
that as long as a big bang is politically preferred to no reform, it is preferred to gradualism both 
in terms of political support and in terms of economic efficiency. 
Another possibility that gradualism  is  politically  preferred to  the big-bang is  when the 
outcomes of reforms are uncertain to individuals in which a gradual or sequential approach 
splits the resistance force and thus boosts the programs’ chance of surviving attacks by special 
interests  groups.  In  his  preliminary  paper,  Rodrik  (1990)  emphasizes  the  importance  of  a 
sustainability policy environment for an eventual success of structural adjustment programs. In 
a separate view, Rodrik (1993) concludes that an explicit understanding of political economy 
forces in a reform process is as important as the content of the reform package itself for its 
success. 
However,  there  is  political  economy  argument  against  gradualism  in  terms  of  the 
distributive  consequences  of  reform.  By  widening  the  scope  of  efficiency  in  improving 
reforms, Martinelli and Tommasi (1993) argue that the government is more likely to gain the 
support  of  larger  segments  of  the  population,  particularly  if  the  losers  of  each  particular 
measure  are  benefited  by  other  measures.  If  the  government  needs  to  pass  a  threshold  of 
popular support at each step, a gradual process risks stop at the each stage by the hurt group at 
that point. Therefore, the government may need to implement all reforms simultaneously even 
if  this  entails  some  aggregate  costs  so  that  credibility  and  political  sustainability  can  be 
intertwined.                   
While most gradualist countries have been described as having slow growth in GDP, China 
defied this and has grown at almost 10%. Therefore, many studies attempt to compare China 
with EEFSU (see McMillan, 2004; Sachs, 1996; Pomfret, 2000). By taking a gradual approach, 
institutions could be allowed to develop naturally taking into account unique domestic politics 
and needs. 
    
2.2 The Political Economy of Transition Reforms 
The literature on the political economy of reforms identifies two broad strands: normative 
and positive. On the one hand, the decision-making problem of reformers subject to political 
constraints is a main priority of the normative political economy of reforms. The use of the 
"agenda-setting hypothesis" in this models capture which the executive branch of government 
that has monopoly power over the design and sequencing of reform packages to vote in the 
legislature or in a popular referendum (Roland, 2002). 
Reformers are assumed to face two types of political constraints (Roland, 1994). Firstly, ex 
ante political constraints, that can deter decision making and can prevent reforms from being 
accepted.  Secondly,  ex  post  political  constraints  which  are  related  to  backlash  and  policy 
reversal after reforms have been implemented and outcomes observed. 
The concept of ex ante and ex post political constraints will be effectively the same, aside 
from the presence of uncertainty and reversal costs (Fernandez and Rodrik, 1991). In terms of 4 
 
uncertainty,  a majority may oppose particular reforms before being implemented, although 
those  same  reforms  would  end  up  benefiting  the  majority  and  would  not  be  reversed  if 
implemented. Thus, uncertainty along the reform path plays an important role in designing a 
politically feasible sequence of reforms. In contrary, reversal costs typically make it harder to 
enact a reform and hence, turning back will be costly. Thus, reversal costs increase the ex ante 
constraints on reform but reduce the ex post constraints.  
In the transition context, the positive analysis of reforms has been somewhat less developed 
than the normative analysis (Roland, 2002). The positive political economy of reform seeks to 
explain differences in the extent of rent seeking and how special interests may effectively 
capture regulatory bodies. Such differences may be insightful in many countries where the 
political  and  legal  institutions  have  been  existed  for  a  long  time  and  can  be  viewed  as 
exogenous  variables.  But  in  the  specific  context  of  transition  economies,  the  institutions 
themselves are a product of the transition process and must be seen as an endogenous variable.  
Sonin (1999) has built a very insightful model of rent seeking that sheds light on many of 
the processes observed in transition countries. In the transition context, rich agents like the 
Russian  oligarchs  gain  benefit  from  low  security  of  property  rights  which  allows  them  to 
convert  corporate  and  social  assets  to  their  private  use.  Therefore,  they  seek  to  capture 
government decision making to prevent reforms that would enhance security of property right 
so that they can exploit economies of scale in rent seeking. For political economy reasons, a 
high  initial  level  of  inequality  in  wealth  and  power  can  lead  to  long-lasting  insecurity  of 
property rights.  
The initial distribution of wealth and power is a primary concern amongst reformers. A 
country with high concentration of wealth and power (e.g. Russia) is the result of the mass 
privatization policy chosen favoring the insiders (Polishchuk, 1999). However, the choice of 
the mass privatization policy itself can also be seen as a result of prior rent-seeking activities, 
which raises the question of why this form of mass privatization was deployed in Russia and 
the Czech Republic, but rejected in Poland and Hungary (Roland, 1996).  
One hypothesis that has not been explored is the cross-country difference in the extent of 
preexisting civil society before transition (Putnam et al., 1993). In this context, there is a strong 
contrast  between  the  situation  of  Poland  and  that  of  Russia.  Poland  had  powerful  social 
networks, including the Catholic Church and the Solidarity trade union. But in Russia and 
other  countries  of  the  former  Soviet  Union,  any  social  networks  hardly  existed  to  be 
independent of the Communist Party, and there is no dissident activity as it would be repressed 
by the  government.  Thus,  it is  important  to  have a better understanding of the social  and 
political  initial  conditions  of  reforms,  which  should  reach  beyond  the  economic  initial 
conditions. 
III. The Transition Models 
3.1 The Soviet Model 
After Vladimir Lenin’s death in 1924, Joseph Stalin created what was known as the soviet 
model  for  centrally  planned  economies  and  was  replicated  around  the  world  by  other 
communist states. The key aspects of the model included as follows (Ericson, 1991): First, a 
strong  hierarchical  authority  structure;  Second,  rigid  central  plans  for  resource  allocation; 5 
 
Third,  a  goal  of  resource  maximization  rather  than  efficiency;  Fourth,  formal  rationing  of 
goods; Fifth, inflexible centrally fixed prices instead of reflective of the true value of the goods 
or services; Sixth, slow response systems with no alternative to assign work; Seventh, absolute 
power exercised by superiors and incentives to meet plans without recognizing economic costs. 
By the 1980s GDP had slumped and people were growing restless. Inefficiency in the Soviet 
economy was often summarized by the saying “the workers pretend to work and the state 
pretend to pay them” (Pomfret, 2002). 
3.1.1 Mikhail Gorbachev’s Reforms 
Under the leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, the USSR attempted two final reforms 
which are Glasnost and Perestroika before the collapse of the Union in 1991. In the former 
reform, Glasnost was a policy to increase transparency and accountability undertaken by 
Gorbachev. Citizens who had been repressed and censored for sixty years now could speak 
up their minds. Parliament was now televised and the government is under intense scrutiny 
as the atrocities were reported in the free press. Thus, a centrally planned economy could 
not be sustained in a new era of political economy. 
Meanwhile, in the latter reform, Perestroika brought about decentralization of power 
and economic decision making whilst maintaining a non market environment with price 
controls and state orders (Krueger, 1993). In 1987, the Supreme Soviet passed the Law of 
Enterprises, beginning the process of Perestroika or economic restructuring. Under the new 
law, enterprises were to become self financing in a bid to loosen central control and to 
increase efficiency. However, at the time prices were still fixed and as such could not make 
the best decisions leading to large deficits. With this condition, enterprises did not have the 
incentives to reduce their reliance on state order. Sachs (1996) believed that Perestroika 
was Gorbachev’s attempt to follow in the Chinese footsteps but was unsuccessful because 
of the differing initial conditions. 
3.1.2 EEFSU Transition 
When undertaking economic reform, there was little debate as to the direction in 
which the successor states should take, but rather the focus was on the speed at which the 
reforms should be conducted (Pomfret, 2002). A transition to market economy relies on the 
pillars of market prices, enterprise reform, removal of trade barriers and financial reform. 
However,  geopolitical  factors  are  quite  important  factor  in  transition  while  economists 
often view transition as an ideological shift toward democracy and the market (Roland and 
Verdier, 1999). In geopolitical terms, transition represents the shift of Eastern Europe and 
the Baltic states toward Western Europe. Indeed, the single most significant factor about 
transition is the change from the status of a satellite country of the Soviet empire to that of 
a  country  belonging  to  the  Western  bloc.  Transition  represents  a  unique  historical 
opportunity for several nations like Eastern Europe and the Baltic state to join the European 
Union. In addition, the prospect of this connection gives credibility to the political and 
economic process of transition in a sense that the adoption of the political and economic 
system of the West is useful to undergo the cost of transition.  
This geopolitical factor may be strong enough to explain why countries from Eastern 
Europe did not suffer from the type of government collapse, anarchy and general diffusion 6 
 
of criminality, inside and outside government that Russia and other countries from the 
former Soviet Union have been facing (Roland and Verdier, 1999). The ability to enforce 
the  law  and  to  protect  property  rights  seems  to  be  a  key  reason  why  Eastern  Europe 
recovered from its fall in output, while Russia and other countries not facing the prospect 
of entry to the European Union experienced a much more prolonged decline of output. 
Geopolitical considerations also play a role in explaining why a version of China's 
dual-track approach was not tried in Eastern Europe, at least at the level of trade across 
countries (Roland, 2002). Essentially, the plans to introduce some form of a dual-track 
approach, which would facilitate in maintaining existing trade contracts, were unsuccessful. 
One possible explanation is that reformist governments wanted to use their window of 
opportunity to create irreversibility by disentangling the planning system.  
If the dual-track approach had been tried in a country like Russia, it would probably 
have failed because of the government collapse in 1991. Such a collapse would have made 
any  contract  enforcement  difficult  to  achieve,  given  the  weakness  of  the  state  and  the 
corruption of the justice system and government administration. Thus, it is clear that the 
resistance to transition proved much harder in the former Soviet Union than in Eastern 
Europe, as witnessed by the greater difficulties in requiring enterprises to face their own 
losses and in adopting macroeconomic stabilization measures (Roland, 2002).      
3.2 The China Model 
3.2.1 The Initial Reforms 
China started experimenting after the death of Mao in 1974. However, reform was 
never going to go far with leader Hua Guofeng who advocates a policy known as the “Two 
Whatevers” in a sense that whatever policy Chairman Mao devised, all officials would 
resolutely support and whatever directives Chairman Mao laid down, all officials would 
forever observe (Schram, 1984).  
This strict adherence to the former leaders approach could not be sustained as the 
economic machinery of the centrally planned economy started to become less and less 
responsive. Guofeng tried to turn this around by importing factories directly from Japan. 
This  was  a  risky  strategy  as  China  was  paying  for  these  imports  on  the  back  of  oil. 
Ironically,  as  its  economic  efficiency  dried  up  and  new  sites  could  not  be  found,  this 
strategy was abandoned which lead to the downfall of Guofeng’s leadership. 
Deng  Xiaoping  swept  to  power  in  1976  after  ousting  conservative  Maoist  Hua 
Guafeng. Deng ushered in a new era of reform towards a market based economy, ironically 
called  “socialism  with  Chinese  characteristics”.  The  two  main  foundations  of  Deng’s 
reforms  centered  around  agriculture  and  foreign  investment.  Deng’s  manner  was  more 
pragmatic that his predecessors saying “it does not matter if the cat is black or white as 
long as it catches mice”. In other words, whatever the policy should be applied must focus 
on growth and prosperity for the people. 
3.2.2 Deng Xiaoping’s Reforms 
Agrarian  reform  was  the  corner  stone  of  the  new  Chinese  economy.  After  the 
complete failure of the Great Leap Forward resulting in the greatest famine, it was clear 
that  the  agriculture  sector,  which  made  up  80%  of  the  workforce,  needed  reforming. 7 
 
Farmers were receiving very low wages and did not receive the “iron rice bowl” social 
support of those who lived in the urban areas (Sachs, 1996). 
The  crux  of  the  reform  was  to  dismantle  the  rigid  plans  for  the  farms  under  a 
commune  system  and  increase  individual  responsibility  (Sachs,  1996).  Under  the  new 
system,  communes  still  existed  as  a  formal  organizational  unit,  but  each  farmer  was 
allocated a state owned plot. Any output above pertaining to what the central plan required 
was retained by the farmer who could then consume or sell it into the market.  
Critically decisions  about  the farming techniques  and output mix were left  to  the 
individual. The new system was providing incentives at the margin to nearly the whole 
sector by 1984 (Naughton, 1995). By creating a set of choices in the system of household 
responsibility, the reform has been seen as a bottom up of reform and this is contrast to the 
approach taken in EEFSU. 
One interesting Chinese institution from the political economy point of view is that 
China chose to liberalize prices in 1984 through a dual-track system (Roland, 2002). For 
planned output, planned prices were maintained and planned contracts for supplies and 
deliveries were kept frozen at a preexisting level and were enforced. Farming communes 
are given a state order which they sell at the state (lower) price and any excess output can 
be sold at the higher market price.  
Normally,  such  a  price  disparity  would  provide  an  opportunity  for  enterprising 
individuals  to  partake  in  arbitrage  and  make  profits  between  the  price  differences. 
However, this was not as prevalent as one might assume due to the creation of economic 
crimes, punishable by death. Dual pricing propped up the state sector, as the state paid the 
lower  price  while  at  the  same  time  allowed  an  expansion  of  a  new  non  state  sector. 
Therefore, China’s dual track system has created a system with no losers (Naughton, 1995). 
China’s  approach  to  reform  has  been  described  as  “growing  out  of  the  plan” 
(Naughton,  1995).  By  maintaining  the  state  sector  with  a  fixed  order,  but  creating 
incentives at the margin for growth, over time the size of the state sector will diminish as a 
proportion of the economy. In other words, the plan was growing out rather than wholesale 
destruction of the state. 
With  a  more  efficient  agricultural  sector,  households  now  had  excess  labour  and 
higher incomes from additional output sold at the market price, leading to the creation of 
new  Township  and  Village  Enterprises  (TVEs).  This  new  sector  became  substantially 
deregulated as towns began a race to the bottom, to attract more of these new enterprises. 
However, Sachs and Woo (2000) argued that TVEs’ density statistics can be misleading as 
the  definition  of  what  a  TVE  is  can  vary,  with  some  private  “red  cap”  enterprises 
registering  as  TVEs.  Thus,  new  non  sector  provided  substantial  growth  but  not  at  the 
expense of the state sector.     
3.2.3 China Transition 
Analysis  of  China’s  transition  broadly  falls  within  two  schools  of  thought, 
experimental and convergence (Sachs and Woo, 2000). Experimentalists argue that China’s 
incremental and experimental approach to reform was the key to its success (Naughton, 
1995). They contend that this strategy can be applied to other economies in transition. On 8 
 
the  other  hand,  the  convergence  school  of  thought  believes  that  China’s  success  was 
despite the gradual approach to reform, but rather convergence with other market based 
economies.  They  argue  that  these  reforms  cannot  be  transplanted  and  put  a  greater 
emphasis on initial conditions (De Melo et al, 1999). 
While in retrospect the Chinese gradualist approach to economic reform appears to 
have been highly successful, there was no clear plan that the leaders appeared to follow at 
the time. Naughton (1995) believes that despite the official version of events presents Deng 
as a leader with a determination to seek truth from facts, evidence shows that there was no 
grand design but a series of experiments. 
In  principle,  the  dual-track  system  has  other  properties  that  are  relevant  in  the 
transition  context.  The  continued  enforcement  of  the  plan  contracts  can  reduce  the 
disorganization  effects  of  price  liberalization  (Roland  and  Verdier,  1999),  thereby 
preventing the output fall otherwise generally observed in transition economies. Finally, 
dual-track system helped prevent the collapse of existing government structures because 
government kept a direct control over economic resources without having to depend solely 
on fiscal revenues to finance essential activities like law enforcement, which are crucial to 
efficient tax collection and many other purposes (Roland and Verdier, 1999). 
3.3 Sequencing 
The sequence of reforms in transition economies are roughly in line with political economy 
theory, which suggests that reforms expected to be more popular should start first (Roland, 
2002). For example, in all Eastern Europe, democratic reforms preceded economic reforms. 
Apart from political reforms, certain other institutional changes  can be decided at an early 
stage of reforms. Fingleton et al. (1996) have argued that the establishment of institutions for 
competition  policy  should  be  among  the  first  reforms  to  be  implemented  in  transition 
economies,  a  particularly  important  reform  given  the  monopolistic  structure  of  industry 
inherited  from  central  planning.  In  practice,  competition  laws  have  generally  been  passed 
rather early in the transition process, in line with the theory. This example also emphasizes the 
danger that can be associated with a wrong sequencing.  
Another  important  early  step  in  the  sequence  of  transition  reforms  is  encouraging  the 
development of a small private sector prior to more comprehensive reforms. Liberalizing the 
small  private  sector  is  often  a  popular  early  measure  that  provides  a  supply  response  in 
emerging markets. In China, the nonstate sector's share of industrial output was already 22 
percent in 1978, thus providing a basis for its growth to 47 percent in 1991 as liberalization 
occurred (Qian and Xu, 1993).  
Sequencing arguments have been applied to privatization. In transition economies, the best 
firms tend to be privatized first Gatsios (1992). The result of privatizing more profitable firms 
first is to create political support and goodwill for further privatization and other reforms. Prior 
to implementing privatization policies, debates concerned mostly on the efficiency of various 
privatization schemes. However, a major effect of privatization policies in some countries is 
the disengaging in the amount of asset which were largely anticipated and has been associated 
with  privatization  processes  and  the  ensuing  consequences,  like  increases  in  rent-seeking 
activities and state capture, and political instability (Roland, 2002).  9 
 
Privatization took many different forms in EEFSU from auctions to handovers to vouchers. 
China opted not to privatize their SOEs but instead focus on creating a new private sector 
rather than on the state expense. Russian privatization is the often cited as poorly executed and 
amplifying inequality through the creation of Russian business oligarchs of former government 
officials. This has leaded some critics to describe the process as piratization (Maltsev, 2006). In 
the beginning period of privatization, it was popular with the public perception. However, by 
1995 this had drastically changed into rejection (Appel, 1997). 
In the first phase of privatization dubbed as “the people’s privatization”, a voucher process 
was used (Appel, 1997). These then were distributed to employees and managers within the 
enterprise with the rest going to the general public. A key difference between the Russian 
approach and that taken in other nations with voucher privatization was the right to sell the 
voucher (Appel, 1997). Shares in the new joint stock companies were granted to individuals 
rather than trade unions or other collectives. 
Workers unsure of the true value of the vouchers were often convinced by management to 
sell  them  at  a  low  price.  Management  influenced  workers  decisions  on  selling  shares  by 
withholding  wages,  setting  up  trusts  with  restrictions  and  physically  restraining  access  to 
shares (Appel, 1997). With high inflation ranged between 152.6% in 1992 and 311% in 1994, 
the value of the vouchers in the eyes of the public had been all but wiped out (Pomfret, 2002). 
Citizens then sold their vouchers under the belief that they were now worthless. 
The second phase of privatization became caught up in the loans for shares scandal. With 
large  budget  deficits,  the  Russian  government  sought  to  use  the  remaining  state  owned 
enterprises in terms of collateral against bank loans to pay for the deficit through an auction 
scheme with the loan contract being accepted by the highest bidder (Appel, 1997). Only a few 
banks  were  allowed  to  participate  in  the  process,  leading  to  low  bids  for  significantly 
undervalued assets. 
During the privatization process, little consideration was given to the question of whether 
privatization was a good idea in the first place (Pomfret, 2002). Russian privatization therefore 
put the concentration of the wealth in the hands of a few people, primarily those who have 
wealth  came  from  large  political  power.  Despite  growing  inequality  and  centralization  of 
power related to the previous communist regime, it was argued that coases theorem applied and 
it did not matter who initially owned the enterprises, but that a market would develop and 
ownership would transfer to the most efficient usage (Pomfret, 2002).        
In transition of a market economy, institutions play an important role in sustaining long-
term  economic  growth.  Some studies  have attempted to  analyze the quality of institutions 
(Pomfret, 2002). Some argued that privatization would encourage the establishment of the rule 
of law by creating a new private class who will lobby the government for protection of their 
rights and investments (Shleifer and Vishny, 1998). 
However, in practice, the incentives for short term gains through asset striping were more 
influential than in long term growth (Hoff and Stiglitz, 2002). Competition needs rules and a 
level of playing field to thrive. Thus, by creating institutions and a legal framework, players 
will be encouraged to take opportunities and invest in the economy.  10 
 
In the opponent view, Pomfret (2002) insisted that institutions cannot just be imported and 
work without taking into account local conditions. Bankruptcy laws for example need to strike 
the right balance between protecting debtors and creditors and this will vary from country to 
country  with  different  initial  conditions,  customs,  politics,  and  stages  of  economic 
development. 
IV. Conclusion 
China’s approach of early gradual economic reform without political reform appears to have 
been very successful in implementing a continually high growth. Experimenting with reforms 
rather than planning reforms has worked very well in China. McMillan (2004) pointed out that 
the honest approach to economic reform is to be deliberately experimental. Thus it is clear that 
prescribed reforms will not always be successful, including transplanting China’s agricultural 
into EEFSU. 
Sachs (1996) argued that China’s gradualist approach cannot be compared with the EEFSU big 
bang  approach  as  China’s  initial  conditions  were  more  favourable  to  the  approach  under 
Gorbachev’s administer. The initial conditions do play a major role in determining the economic 
successes, however, they are just one factor amongst many and tend to play a minor role. 
Hence, it is obvious that no model can apply equally to all transition of economies. Agrarian 
reforms which were highly successful in China did not work in Uzbekistan (Pomfret, 2000). The 
initial conditions and comparative advantages play a large role in the successes of transition 
strategies. While EEFSU was highly industrialized with a large urban population, China was 
largely agricultural and had a predominantly rural population (Sachs, 1996). 
Another  point  made  in  relation  with  China  and  EEFSU  is  that  of  economic  and  political 
perspective, reform all run at once. China was very explicit that economic reform needs to come 
before political reform and this appears to have been successfully implemented. On the other 
hand, the USSR under Gorbachev’s leadership attempted both simultaneously, which then have 
been directed as reason for the downfall of the Soviet Union.  
However, it is dangerous to suggest that democracy and economic reform cannot go hand in 
hand. China was successful due to their gradual and experimental approach which provides more 
economic stability and less pain than shock therapy instead of political stability which was the 
key to its success.          
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